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Reactor control and safety systems are discussed with emphasis
on safety considerations. Consideration is given to the importance
of reactor characteristics, control and safety system characteristics,
the operational program of the reactor, and credible accidents, in
a determination of safety of operation.
Ecperience with research reactor control and safety systems
has led to the development of certain general principles that deter
mine reactor safety. These principles, with suitable modifications,
should be applicable to establishing the safety of control and
safety systems for other reactor types including present power
reactors and advanced designs.
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Introduction
An important consideration in the design of a control system
for a nuclear reactor is provision fdr safe operation. Most reactor
control systems tare divided into two distinct sections, one of which
provides for routine operation and one designed to p±ovide for
emergency situations. The latter is frequently called a saf,ety
system.
Safe operation of a nuclear reactor requires an adequate safety
system. It also requires careful design of the routine control system
for startup and power level operation. In addition, carefiil atten
tion must be given to operating practices.
This paper points out some of the important aspects of control
of nuclear research and power reactors. The literature contains
numerous descriptions and discussions of instruments used in reactor
control; relatively little has been published on the subject of
safety cotisideratians in reactor control system design0 Although
most of the discussion here is based on experience with researóh
reactors, most of the underlying principles are valid for power
reactors, However, the final designs and the resulting hardware
for the two classes of reactors may be significantly different0
* Nuclear Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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Reactor Characteristics Important in Control System Design
An important problem in reactor control system design is the
requirement that the instrumentation and control equipment be
capable of operating over an unusually wide range, Ranges of 10
to 11 decades are not uncommon. Figure 1 shows typical reactor
startup.and operating ranges. Appropriate instrumentation is
indicatd’. It is necessary to use several different types of
detecting equipment to provide, valid information throughout the
entire startup. From shutdown or source level to .about three decades
above, proportional counters are used, Over the nex to to three
decades, fission chambers are employed. By moving these chambers
away from the reactor core the effective range can be extended to
provide information up to full power. Compensated ionization
chambers, if properly adjusted, can be used from about six decades
below up to full power. Uncompensated chambers provide information
from three decades below up to and somewhat above thefull pOwer
rating of the reactor. These detectors are usually employed in the
safety system.
For safe operation of a nuclear reactor a knowledge of the
rate of change of power level as well as the power level itself is
required. Since in most cases the nuclear instruments sense the
neutron population within the reactor, rate of change of neutron
population can be derived. The rate of change of neutron population
is usually described in terms of the reactor period. Reactor period
is defined as the time required for the neutron flux to change by a
factor of e. Figure 1 indicates that period information is usually
available from six decades below up to full power, Instrumentation
exists which will rovide period information from the low level
counting channels.
Period information is used for control purposes during startup.
It is fed to the safety system both during startup and operation at
fixed power. The safety system thus protects against short reactor
periods in addition to excessively high power levels,
Kinetic Behavior of Reactors
The response of a reactor to a change in ex.cess reactivity is
an important factor in the successful performance of a control system.
This response is strongly dependent both upon the operating power
level’ and the amount of excess reactivity present. If the excess
reactivity of the reactor is such that it is delayed critical, that
is the contribution of de.layed neutrons is necessary to produce
criticality, its behavior depends. almost entirely on the delayed
neutrons. In a thermal reactor using Uranium 235 the average
generation time for neutrOns is then about 0.1 seconds and the
response of the reactor to change.s in excess reactivity is rela
tively sluggish. However, should the excess reactivity in the
reactor exceed the delay fractionA, the generation time is
determined by prompt neutrons and is of the’order of microseconds.
For instance, for the swimming-pool-type research reactor the
3
generation time under these circumstances would be about x lO
seconds. On fast reactors these times may be:of the order of 1O
seconds. These short generation times produce correspondingly more
rapid changes in.power level in response to a change in reactivity.
It is seen that those reactors in which excess reactivities
are maintained at less than their delay fractions, will be rela
tively easier to control. Once beyond the delay fraction the
control requirements become quite severe because of the fast
response required of the control system. Reactors designed so
that delayed neutrons do not contribute to criticality may place
severe requirements on a control system.
Reactor Protection
Emergency shutdown of a reactor may be accomplished by rapid
insertion of neutron absorbing materials into the core, by rapid
removal of fuel or by a rapid change of the nettron leakage from
the core.
Most research reactors and many power reactors employ absorb
ing rods containing cadmium or boron. Some of these rods are used
to make small slow changes in reactivity for control. The others
are inserted or dropped into the reactor when an emergency condition
arises. The process of dropping or rapidly inserting safety rods
into a reactor is often referred to as tscramming?? the reactor.
In addition to changes n reactivity made externally, internal
.. changes in core composition or structure may occur. For example,
a change in power level may cause a change in neutron absorption
or leakage thus changing the excess reactivity. Such changes may
be caused by changes in temperature or pressure which produce
corresponding..çhanges in core density or structure. If an increase
in temperature decreases reactivity, the reactor is said to have a
negative temperature coefficient of reactivity. Conversely if an
increase in temperature produces an increase in reactivity, the
coefficient is said to be positive. Clearly, a negative temperature
coefficient, of reactivity which remains negative over the entire
range of operating temperatures provides a degree of self-protection.
The size and time of lag of the coefficient and thus the degree of
protection depends on the reactor type.. For instance, a homogeneous
reactor has a much larger negative temperature coefficient than the
swimming—pool-type reactor.
Other phenomena, such as the Doppler effect and void formation,
contribute to changes of reactivity. If these effects tend to
reduce the reactivity inherent protection exists. The response
time. of these effects are of extzeme importance in determining the
protection they afford. The existence of a net positive temperature
coefficient in a reactor system is usually considered intolerable,
Safety Systems
Two safety systems which have been widely used are the
“auctioneerin” type and the coincident” type. The MTR—ORNL
safety system is an auctioneering type. The instrument block
diagram of this system is shown in Figure 2. This system employs
several complete channels that monitor the neutron or power level
as well as the reactor period during all phases of reactor operation.
These channels feed information to a common bus, known as the Sigma
bus, which in turn monitors the mechanisms which hold the safety rods.
Coupling between the electronic instrumentation and the safety rods is
accomplished by specially designed electromagnets. When the period
or neutron level reach certain pre-selected values the Sigma bus
acts to decrease the current in the electromagnets thus releasing
the safety rods which then fall into the reactor.
Since all channels are connected to the Sigma bus, any single
channel is capable of dropping all rods into the core0 On most
installations employing the MTR-ORNL type safety system, the rods
•fall under the, influence of gravity. Because of its extremely
short response time and its auctioneering arrangement (the control
of the safety rods goes to the highest. bidder) it provides a maxi
mum of protection. This system was developed primarily for research
reactors whose operational and experimental characteristics are
frequently changed. Although any malfunction or false signal, in
any single channel of the system will shutdown the reactor, this is
usually more of an inconvenience than a disadvantage on a research
reactor.
Power reactors cannot usually withstand physically or tolerate
operationally unnecessary shutdowns. The coincident, type safety
system3 is designed to reduce such shutdowns to a minimum.. In this
system, which also uses a multiplicity of channels, two or more
channels must agree that an emergency condition exists before a
reactor scram is initiated. This system, although it provides for
continuity of reactor operation does not generally offer the same
degree or reliability of protection as the auctioneering type0
There are two reasons for this:
(1) the requirement that two or more channels concur usually
introduces delays in the initiation of safety action, and
(2) additional equipment is required which incre.ses the
probability of component failure. Siddall has shown, however, that
if properly selected and arranged in a suitable complex, the addition
of components can enhance rather than diminish the reliability of a
system.
Although many safety systems fall into one of the two categories
discussed above it is generally true that both the characteristics
of the individual reactor and its operational requirements strongly
influence the choice of an appropriate safety system. Thus some
modification of one of the above systems may be used or some
entirely different scheme may be employed.
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No matter what type of safety system is chosen, the response
time of the system is of primary importance.5 A quantitative value
of time response may be difficult to establish. The response time
must generally be evaluated separately for each type of reactor
accident considered. Response time may be defined as the total
elapsed tine from the existence of an emergency condition to the
time the reactor power level (or period) is brought to a prescribed
value, Response time defined in this way is critically dependent
on the type of accident, the type of reactor, and the design of the
safety system itself. For example, if an amount of reactivity
equal toA is suddenly i±iserted into the reactor, making it prompt
critical, a meaningful definition of response time is the elapsed
time from the insertion of the positive reactivity to the time
that the reactor power level ceasesto increase. In other cases
we may wish to define the response time as that time required by
the safety system to reduce the power to a prescribed value. Under
either of the definitions above, the response time depends on the
-time constants of the instrumentation, the release time of the
electromagnets, or similar devices, the effectiveness of the safety
rods, orr,their equIvalent, and the inherent characteristics of the
reactor .
The tine response required of a safety system must be determined
during the initial design stages of the reactor and its control
system. Establishing the requirements of a system requires detailed
examination of reactor response. For instance, if we postulate the
sudden insertion of 2 of positive reactivity, it night be expected
that 2,62 of negative “reactivity would have to be inserted rapidly to
stop the power excursion. Actually, if appi’oximately l’ is inserted
quickly, the reactor power will level off momentarily hile waiting
for the delayed neutrons. This delay gives additional time for the
remaining necessary negative reativity to be inserted, Figure 3
clearly demonstrates this point.)
A fact often overlooked in the consideration of a safety system
is that safety rods, an important part of the safety system, may be
a source of potential danger. Indeed in some cases the potential
danger may be the only thing provided by the so-called safety system.
As an example, suppose one postulates a pressurized reactor
wherein the safety rods must act against a high pressure in order
to shutdown the reactor. If the response time of this system is long
compared to probable accidental reactor periods, then little or no
protection is offered. Should the forces that hold or drive the
safety rods fail, the only place for the rods to go is out of the
reactor. Thus, the only role the safety rods can play in this case
is that of getting the reactor into trouble or compounding an existing
trouble. If this is the situation, the reactor would be better off
without any external safety system whatsoever.
Since the speed of response of any safety system is limited,
certain emergency situations may arise in which protection is
provided only by the inherent characteristics of the reactor itself.
If investigation indicates that the resulting protection is insuf
ficient or unreliable theproposed reactor design is certainly
questionable.
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Those reactors in which a credible accident can be brought
under control only by some inherent characteristic of the reactor
itself, such as a fast negative coefficient of reactivity can employ
a safety system that brings the reactor under control after the
inherent characteristic of the reactor has delayed or stopped an
excursion. Thus the fast acting inherent characteristic limits
the early part of any rapid power excursion until slower corrective
action can be taken by an external safety system. It should be
emphasized that in such cases the safety system must be carefully
studied in order that no situation arise in which the safety system
itself represents a potential hazard to the reactor.
The rapid shutdown or scramming of the reactor by dropping ll
safety rods into the reactor is a drastic form of corrective action.
In order to avoid this action for minor power level excursions,
other forms of corrective action by the control system are employed.
Automatic insertion of the safety rods into the reactor by suitable
mechanisms, can in most instances handle minor excursions. This
type of corrective action is frequently called Reverse or Automatic
Rundown. Some reactors employ fast reverses, slow reverses, or even
partial reverses, depending onthe power excursion to be handled.
These actions must in no way compromise the protection offered by
the safety system.
Startup Considerations
Starting the reactor from shutdown level and raising it to full
power covers a wide range of operation. During startup safety rods
are withdrawn, introducing positive reactivity. If this reactivity
is introduced rapidly, the reactor gets on a short period and rises
to a high power level in a short interval of time, If this period
is short compared to the response time of the safety system, the
reactor nay be damaged or destroyed before the safety system has
time to take corrective action.
To avoid this situation, withdrawal rates are restricted such
that if an accident occurs in which all of the safety rods are
withdrawn simultaneously at the maximum possible speed, the resulting
period and power excursion fall we’l within the capabilities of the
safety system. Newson’s criterion ,2 has been used on several
reactors in establishing the rate of insertion of reactivity
consistent with the response time of the safety system. This
criterion was established for a heterogeneous-light-water-moderated
research reactor. This or similar criteria should be envoked for
other-reactor types.
Power Level Consideration
For automatic operation of a research reactor at rated power
level a simple on-off type servo control unit is frequently employed.
The servo controls a neutron absorbing regulating rod which is
inserted or withdrawn from the core in order to maintain a prescribed
power level. In most cases the reactivity of the regulating rod is
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small enough so that if the control rod is accidentlly.withdrawn
completely, the reactor will not become prompt critical. The
internal factors that influence reactivity are generally more
numerous and may produce larger effects in power reactors. Thus
the automatic control system will be correspondingly more compli
cated.
From a safety point of view, the problem is that of establishing
how much reactivity is p].aced at the disposal of the servo control
unit at any given time. The larger this amount of reactivity, the
more important becomes the rliability of the automatic control
system.
Some reactor control systems use an automatic control system
to compensate for the effect of xenon buildup and burnup On reac
tivity. In such systems caution must be exercised to insure that
no large quantity of positive reactivity can be inserted rapidly
due to malfunctioning of the system.
Conclusion
Out of experience with reactors now in operation, a philosophy
of control and safety is developing for these particular reactor
types. At present, these control: systems have many features in
common. Extensions of present systems will probably be applied to
reactors of many types for research and for power. Fundamental
principles of reactor control, which will serve as the foundation
for control and safety criteria, must be carefully developed in the
design and specification of reactor control systems of the future.
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Fig. 3 Flux Response for a Single Step in Reactivity
as Corrective Action
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